An essay on comparison as a method in social sciences by Nikolinakos, Marios
   





  An essay on comparison as a method in social
sciences
Nikolinakos Marios University of Nijmegen
https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.334
 
  Copyright © 1977 Marios Nikolinakos 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Nikolinakos, M. (1977). An essay on comparison as a method in social sciences. Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών Ερευνών,
29(29), 44-54. doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/grsr.334
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 03:45:15 |
an essay 
on comparison 





University of Nijmegen 
The Netherlands
• * The following text served as a
lecture at the international seminar 
on «Organization and Problems of 
Social Science Empirical Research in 
Different Cultural Environments» which 
was organized in Berlin by the Science 
Centre on November 28th and 29th, 1975. 
It is presented here in a slightly altered
I intend, in this paper, to discuss shortly the 
fundamentals of the concept «comparative 
research» within a crosscultural frame. I will use, 
where necessary, examples and paradigms from 
economics without claiming to deal with compara­
tive research in economics itself.
I. comparison and scientific research
Let us pose the fundamental question at first: 
why do we compare? It could be argued that 
comparison is the fundamental function of scien­
tific research. Logic in this sense can be deduced 
to comparison. But I will not discuss this point of 
philosophy or psychology here. Let us take the 
more superficial meaning of «comparison» with 
which we are concerned here, that is comparison 
as an element of scientific research. The question 
is closely related to the scope and consequently 
to the reason of scientific research. According to 
one definition, scientific research aims at reveal­
ing «laws», i.e. relations obeying some regularity 
as long as the same conditions are fulfilled, in 
order to explain phenomena and in order to be 
able to predict them. In this sense scientific re­
search begins with observation of the surrounding 
world, of phenomena, and tries in a following 
step to classify them by applying different 
criteria. This process of classification implies ac­
tual comparison.
The next question one must pose should be 
why the need to reveal «laws». There are some 
who argue that scientific research is connected to 
natural curiosity of man as a finite being. This is 
the concept of an «ivory-tower science», which 
has existed, at times in history, which has be­
come, however, marginal in modem times. A 
closer examination of scientific research through 
history reveals unequivocally, I think, a practical 
orientation of scientific research. Observing the 
world around us in order to detect regularities, 
i.e. laws, we see that it has been connected with 
some practical aim. The first scientist in this 
sense was the primitive cave man who 
«discovered» fire and how to make it. In this 
sense it is irrelevant to my view whether he con­
nected fire to some supernatural power with 
magic, etc. The primitive man, thus, moved along 
the same steps as the modern scientist who ob­
serves phenomena in order to reveal «laws» for 
the sake of predicting phenomena which means 
that in this case one can either use the 
phenomena for some practical purpose or draw 
the respective conclusions thereof for practical 
action and attitude. I would argue, in any case, 
that in our times science is being carried through 
on the criterion of practicability, i.e. on the basis
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of the applicability of scientific research for some 
definite practical purpose. This is more or less 
unequivocal, I think, in the case of natural sci­
ence and also with social sciences. The criterion 
of practicability is evident even in the case of 
purely theoretical research in an indirect way, i.e. 
in the sense of the repercussions this abstract re­
search has on the method with which more prac­
tically orientated research is being carried 
through.1 In this sense scientific research has be­
come political, using the term at first in its Aris­
totelian meaning. Through the increased socializa­
tion of scientific research science has acquired a 
polito-economie meaning as well.2 It has de­
veloped to an instrument of perpetuating power 
structures and socio-economic relations. I would 
formulate my conclusion at this stage of my ar­
gument in the following two statements:
Statement one: the definition of science is a his­
torical one, i.e. the scope and reason of scientific 
research are defined by the existing historical 
—read social and economic, political in gen­
eral—conditions.
Statement two: every scientific research in our 
time is either useless or of political relevance (the 
term «politicai» being defined as above).
II. comparison in social research
Having discussed shortly «comparison» in re­
spect to scientific research in general as well as 
the frame in which the latter functions, we should 
make, I think, the step towards specifying the 
subject we are concerned with in this paper: 
comparative social research. I think that 
«comparative science» as such creates more prob­
lems than it intends to solve. It must become 
clear that comparative science is in this case a 
method and it has been used as such so far. But 
a method is useless if it is not defined in regard 
to its scope, its value as a tool of scientific re­
search .
1. Take the example of the statistician who works on statis­
tical methods on purely theoretical grounds. His results may 
be primarily of interest only for statisticians, but the results of 
his research are relevant for the methodology applied in em­
pirical research. The case of the theoretical economist working 
on some model is most clear. He postulates the assumptions 
of his research implicitly or explicitly out of a real world with 
given political and social structures. Therefore, his results, 
which finally claim to be «purely» theoretical, are in reality 
politically and socially conditioned. A most eloquent example 
is the «pure theory of international trade» which finally ends 
in being a legitimization of the historically developed impact 
of rich over poor nations.
2. Compare in this context the foreword of Friedrich Edding
in B. Dieckmann’s book Zur Strategie des systematischen in­
ternationalen Vergleichs, Stuttgart 1970, also Dieckmann him­
self, loc. eit., p. 19 f. Also D. Berstecher, Zur Theorie und
Technik des internationalen Vergleichs, Stuttgart 1970, p.34.
Science claims in general to be universal in re­
gard to method and in regard to conclusions. So­
cial science has manifested in the afterwar period 
gradually a feeling of relativity not only in regard 
to its conclusions which are conditioned by his­
torical factors. The methodology itself has been 
partly challenged in relation to its applicability in 
different polito-economie and cultural environ­
ments.3
Considering the genesis of social sciences it be­
comes apparent that every social science began as 
a «national» science; the concrete phenomena ob­
served in the socio-cultural and political systeirffin 
which they were living led the great founders of 
these sciences to some conclusions, which they 
tended to generalize. In the case of economics 
Adam Smith, Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, Friedrich 
List, Jean Baptiste Say—to name only a few—de­
parted from the economic phenomena observed in 
their respective countries and detected the 
«eternai» laws governing economic activity.4 
Even Marx, in his analysis of the capitalist sys­
tem, departed from the situation as it existed and 
developed in England. The appearance of the His­
torical School with Wagner, Sombart, Melgert 
and the other famous representatives of this 
school was a reaction to the method applied. In a 
sense this was a challenge of the universal valid­
ity of results acquired on the grounds-of a special 
method of reasoning under special conditions.5
This initially «national» character of social sci­
ences in regard to their genesis takes a particular 
meaning in respect to comparison as a process of 
analysing phenomena and its methodology. For 
comparison is actually bi-dimensional, one can 
compare in time (or through time) or in space. 
Does the same phenomenon, taken at different 
points in time, retain its character, remain the 
same? In a finite world, I think, we have to face 
here an apparent problem since the difference in 
time of a phenomenon is not a difference of time 
in itself but of different (or similar) conditions at 
two different points in time. In this case—let us
3. See the discussion of the problems arising in connection 
with empirical survey research in F. W. Frey, «Cross-Cultural 
Survey Research in Political Science», in R. T. Holt-J. E. 
Turner (eds), The Methodology of Comparative Research, 
New York 1970, pp. 173 ff, E. K. Scheuch, «The Cross- 
Cultural Use of Sample Surveys: Problems of Comparability», 
in S. Rokkan (ed), Comparative Research across Cultures and 
Nations, Paris — The Hague, 1968, pp.176 ff, also R. E. 
Mitchell, Survey Materials Collected in the Developing Coun­
tries: Obstacles to Comparisons, op. cit., pp.210 ff, R. L. 
Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics, 
Chicago 1971, pp. 140 ff, finally, S. Rokkan,-S. Verba- 
J. Viet-E. Almasy, Comparative Survey Analysis, The Hague- 
Paris, 1969.
4. See Berstecher, op. cit., pp. 16-18.
5. Compare also the case of political science and sociology, 
in Berstecher, op. cit., pp.18 ff, Merritt, op. cit., pp.4 ff.
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call it the time of historical comparison, time 
being the dimension of conditions conceived of in 
a historical process. In the case of comparison in 
space we have a phenomenon observable at the 
same time under different conditions. Let us call 
this case space-historical. In reality, in both cases 
we deal with the same situation, i.e. we consider 
different conditions irrespective of whether they 
are due to time or space. Time and space thus 
give the historical dimension of the phenomena 
but I doubt whether they have a direct influence 
on the substance of the phenomena. In other 
words similarity or difference of two phenomena 
is the same thing with similarity or difference of 
the respective conditions underlying the phenom­
ena. Even the third case—let us call it the 
mixed-historical one—where we compare simul­
taneously through time at different points in 
space, does not differ from the first two cases. It 
is again a question of conditions, a question of 
the reproducibility of historical conditions.
Here, I am actually posing the question of 
comparison as a method; which is posing the 
question, why compare at all. But before dealing 
with this question it is fundamental to deal with 
the preliminary questions of, first, what is it that 
one compares and second whether one can com­
pare or how one compares. The latter question is 
posed here not in the initial sense of logic men­
tioned at the beginning of this paper, but in the 
meaning of comparison as a method.
What do we compare actually in social 
research? Is it phenomena that we compare, i.e. 
processes understood as the interaction of causes 
and effects? Or, do we compare attitudes, where 
again we should specify whether we compare at­
titudes of individuals, groups, nations or cultures? 
Or do we compare situations, i.e. the end-effect 
of an interaction of causes? Perhaps one would 
argue that these questions are irrelevant as the 
process of comparison is to find out the similarity 
of two things by specifying their characteristics 
(in the case of people, or situations) or the condi­
tions under which they have been developed and 
exist (in the case of situations or attitudes) or 
their form (in the case of phenomena). In com­
paring two things one tries as known to find out 
how far two things are equal. But the question is 
when are two things equal? And since history 
does not repeat itself at least in form but is 
characterised by phantasy even when it repeats 
itself, to what extent can two things be unequal 
and still be considered nevertheless as equal?
Consider, for example, phenomenon A defined 
as A (ai,bi, ci, di), in which case the letters a,b,c 
and d denote its characteristics or conditions and 
the suffix 1 the definition of the phenomenon in
time. Suppose that we compare phenomenon A 
with phenomenon B at a different point in time 
(denoted by suffix 2) defined as B (a2, bî, C2). 
Condition d is missing. How far can A and B be 
considered as equal? Consider furthermore that 
from a quantitative point of view the similarity 
between A and B is greater, the greater the 
number of the characteristics or conditions de­
fining both phenomena and the less the difference 
in characteristics or conditions between A and B 
are. But how far is this relation influenced by 
qualitative aspects? How unimportant is condition 
d in the above example that one can say A and B 
are equal? Is this a problem to be decided upon 
according to the specific case every time? And if 
it is so, how far we accept, a priori, a bias in 
defining two phenomena and bringing them to­
gether depending on the subjective judgement of 
the scientist? I would proceed further and argue 
that if case d is valued by two scientists ob­
serving the same situation quite differently, you 
arrive at two contradictory statements; one for 
which d is unimportant saying that A and B are 
equal, and the other for which d is important, 
saying that A and B are not equal. I do not need 
to underline the doubtfulness as regards the valid­
ity of both statements, furthermore their political 
implications as defined above.
But there is a more fundamental problem in re­
gard to comparison. When one compares, one 
does not compare at random. One compares two 
things which by observation have some similarity; 
in other words two things which are comparable, 
otherwise comparison as a method is devoid of 
any meaning. When Przeworski and Teune argue 
that the answer to the question of comparability 
between «apples and oranges» is that «they are 
fruits»,1 they miss the point, if we understand 
«comparison» as we do in this context, as a sci­
entific method and not as a means for detecting 
criteria for reasons of classification from the point 
of view of formal logic. From this point of view 
of thé question such an approach is nonsensical, 
as everything is then comparable. But comparison 
as a method implies implicitly that one aims at 
finding similarities and equality between two 
things. This is the fundamental logic of compari­
son as a method. / would argue that comparison 
as a method implies the comparability of two 
things, and that it aims at testifying equality be­
tween them or proving their inequality. In terms 
of the example used above plain observation tes­
tifies that a number of characteristics a, b, c, etc., 
are common in both phenomena A and B. What
1. See A. Przeworski-H. Teune, The Logic of Comparative 
Social Inquiry, N. York-London-Toronto-Sydney 1970, p.10, 
also p.86 f.
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is unknown is to what extent they exist in both 
definitions so that no statement can be expressed 
a priori as to A and B being equal or unequal. 
But there exist some grounds pointing to the 
equality of A and B and, therefore, to their com­
parability.
We have come by this to a very crucial ques­
tion regarding comparison as a method. Does the 
comparability of two objects arise out of factual 
characteristics or is it simply a definitional 
question? There is a vicious circle here. If one 
accepts the first theory then one faces the prob­
lems of how one detects the factual characteris­
tics as the process of testifying them implies 
aforehead their definition as the logically pre­
ceding step. If one accepts the second theory 
then the danger of bias is inherent as the exis­
tence of characteristics becomes relative, it be­
comes a matter of definition. Przeworski and 
Teune argue that «social phenomena do not have 
a property of 'being comparable’ or 'not 
comparable’» and that «'comparability’ depends 
upon the level of generality of the language that 
is applied to express observations». In other 
words, it is a matter of «measuring» phenomena.1 
To take a similar example to the «apples and 
oranges» from economics. The investment-quota 
to social product in an economy and money circu­
lation have one property in common, that they 
are both economic concepts as apples and 
oranges are both fruits. But it does not make any 
sense to compare both of them directly. It makes 
sense to compare them each in itself at different 
points in time or at least in different countries.
The question raised here goes of course beyond 
the scope of this paper as it refers to the general 
problem of conceptualizing reality. I do not in­
tend to discuss this problem here to a great ex­
tent. I would like only to emphasize the mag­
nitude of the problems we are faced with in dis­
cussing the question of comparison as a method. 
It must also he pointed out here how far the ob­
ject of comparison itself affects comparability. In 
the field of social sciences phenomena have been 
conceptualized in general. Concepts like elite, 
state, power, peace, freedom express more or 
less notions, subjects, that do not exist in the 
sense that they are open to physical observation. 
They are definitions of attitudes, situations, rela­
tions, of different contents at points of time. In 
this aspect I claim that there can not be an objec­
tive basis of comparison in factual terms. This is 
possible only so far as unconscious processes of 
perceiving reality are concerned, that is so far as 
plain everyday observation is concerned. Scien­
tific research and scientific comparison begin with
I. Przeworski-Teune, op. cit., p.10 f, 93.
defining reality by conceptualizing reality, in 
which case a bias is involved despite the fact that 
it gets objectified through the measures scientists 
develop. But actually the problem arises from the 
fact that objectification is a matter of scientists 
(in the plural), there exist accordingly many 
«measures», many «languages» of conceptualizing 
reality. To conclude therefore: comparability is a 
function of the concept used to define a 
phenomenon, and in this sense relative by defini­
tion .
It should be remarked that in comparing two 
phenomena2 there are two aspects which should 
be kept apart the one referring to the 
identification3 of the phenomenon; one looks in 
this case to find out the properties defining the 
phenomenon and apply them in time and in space 
so that one is sure that it is the same phenome­
non one is comparing. The second aspect refers 
to the fact of finding out the degree of similarity, 
of equality at two or more different points in time 
and/or in space. Both aspects are important but 
different, although they usually get mixed in the 
relevant discussion. Take the example used 
above. We considered the case where A and B 
differ only in one element, d, and asked ourselves 
how far we can speak in this case of «equal», 
and therefore comparable phenomena. This is the 
aspect of the identification of the phenomenon 
observed which we have been dealing with so far. 
We have just concluded that comparability of two 
phenomena is a function of the concept used to 
define them. In this sense comparability, i.e. the 
identification of two situations, two phenomena, 
or whatever we are comparing, is usually solved 
by definition in the process of conceptualizing re­
ality; this is the initial step of comparison as a 
method, and in a sense preliminary to it. The 
main concern of comparative research is, how­
ever, to find out the degree of similarity (or of 
equality) between two or more points in time 
and/or in space. I would claim, therefore, that 
comparison in a narrow sense as a method in so­
cial sciences, which is the object of my concern 
in this paper, is nothing else but measuring4 the
2. It must be clear by now that I use the terms «thing», 
«phenomenon», «object» as equal, to mean in general the 
«object» of scientific research—and in our case, of compara­
tive research.
3. 1 would like to point out that my concept of 
«identification» is somewhat different to that used by Dieck­
mann (op. cit., pp.34-36) and Berstecher (op. cit., pp. 29-34). 
For them identification is the process of finding out similarity 
which corresponds to my concept «degree» of similarity. 1 am 
using «identification» in the sense of defining the phenomenon 
to be compared.
4. 1 would like to point out as well, that 1 use the term 
«measure» here in a different sense to that given to it by 
Przeworski and Teune as cited above (in text). These authors
47
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 03:45:15 |
’Επιθεώρηση Κοινωνικών ’Ερευνών, α' τετράμηνο 1977
degree of similarity between two or more objects 
in time and/or space. The comparative method, 
in a narrow sense, is thus the techniques and 
procedures of research aiming at measuring the 
degree of similarity between two or more 
phenomena.
It must be warned, however, against reducing 
and confining the comparative method only to a 
matter of technique detached from its epis­
temological grounds.1 Measuring has developed 
in the postwar period to some kind of «science» 
in itself, measuring has been substantialized for 
its own sake and the contact with the object 
measured and the problems connected with it 
tends often to be broken, so that neither the 
limits, nor the implications of the «measuring 
system» developed so far have been of concern 
to many scientists involved in empirical research. 
In reality every technique of measuring 
phenomena in the process of comparing needs to 
be justified in its scope, in its implications, finally 
in relation to the object of measurement. Other­
wise, we are dealing with a science that has de­
veloped perfect methods of measurement but ar­
riving at a point where the object of measurement 
is no longer in sight. Mathematical economics and 
econometry are a good example in this respect. 
Economists have been able to measure many 
things but they do not know anymore what they 
are measuring, and consequently, they are not 
able either to explain phenomena or to propose 
adequate measures of policy for solving existing 
problems.
It must be emphasized in this context finally 
that' the operation of identification of phenomena 
in the comparative method is common to all so­
cial sciences as it refers to the fundamentals of 
social and generally scientific research. Compari­
son as an operation aiming at detecting the degree 
of similarity or equality between two or more 
phenomena is not identical in all social sciences. 
The techniques of measurement for each disci­
pline differ according to the phenomena to be ob­
served and compared as well as according to the 
general scope of comparing.
III. crosscultural comparative research
We can now discuss the question of why we 
compare which is important in respect to the use­
fulness and justification of comparison as a
use the term as equal to «language», actually in respect to the 
process of identification of comparability. I use the term 
«measure» in regard to the second process involved in com­
parison as a method, i.e. in regard to the «degree of similarity 
or equality».
1. Compare Przeworski-Teune, op. cit., Preface p.x.
method in crosscultural research. It must be 
pointed out that we have been discussing so far 
the fundamentals of the comparative method 
under the implicit assumption that cultural or na­
tional factors were absent. In other words we 
have examined comparison as a method in a 
one-dimensional space meaning by that a com­
pound national or cultural space.
In reality, however, the comparative method 
has been proposed and developed—if at all—as a 
method of comparing phenomena in different cul­
tures or nations or «across cultures and nations». 
Comparative research becomes thus multi­
dimensional, it is of the «space-historical» or the 
«mixed-historical» type described in the second 
part of this paper. If we come back to the discus­
sion of the previous section under this aspect, 
comparative research as a method becomes more 
complicated and more ambiguous as regards the 
validity of the results achieved. It is in this sense 
that we must pose the question of the reasons for 
which the comparative method is propagated and 
used.
In the preceding analysis we have dealt with 
three aspects of comparing: In the context about 
the scope of scientific research, we concluded 
that scientific research aims at revealing «laws». 
In this context «comparison» finds its justification 
as a scientific method. Furthermore, we argued 
that comparison as a method of scientific research 
must have some meaning, i.e. it must refer to 
«comparable» things and not to phenomena taken 
at random. Finally, we defined comparative re­
search as a method in a narrow sense as a meas­
uring operation.
The causes given for the appearance of cross- 
cultural research vary in the relevant literature. 
The interdisciplinary approach that has gained 
ground in the last years, some «need» «feit» by 
«specialists in a given geographic area» to look 
beyond the limited confines of their region, 2 the 
«emergence of competent social scientists 
throughout the world», 3 practical policy-aims on 
the micro-level, 4 are among these causes.
I would count three main plausible reasons for 
the comparative method, one of a historical the 
other two of a methodological-political nature:
Firstly, the comparative method on a crosscul­
tural basis has been developed—to some extent 
systematically—within the scope of the economic 
development of the nations that emerged as polit­
ical units after the end of World War Two. Many 
disciplines, like economics, political science,
2. Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner in the preface to the 
book of Przeworski and Teune.
3. Przeworski-Teune, op. cit., p.xi.
4. Dieckmann, op. cit., pp.141 ff.
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sociology, have dealt with the problem of de­
velopment of these societies on a macro-level. In­
ternational comparisons became thus a part of the 
research object.
Secondly, many scientists have found on 
these grounds the possibility of developing and 
testing new (or old) theories aiming at revealing 
«laws» of general validity. The steady inter­
nationalization of the problems mankind has been 
facing since the end of the Second World War 
has given the opportunity to search beyond the 
national boundaries for the verification or falsifi­
cation of theories. In this aspect the crosscultural 
comparative method has substituted—at least 
from the point of view of the scientists’ inten­
tions—the lack of experiment in social sciences.1 
Comparison across cultures and nations has been 
thus looked upon as the method that would ren­
der results supporting or denying the general val­
idity of hypotheses and theories.
Thirdly, comparative research across cultures 
and nations has been connected with policy im­
plications. This is an issue directly inherent in the 
bulk of such research within many of the Agen­
cies of the United Nations like FAO, ILO, UN­
CTAD, etc., or other such organizations like the 
OECD, the GATT, etc. But it is at the same time 
indirectly connected to the second, «purely» 
theoretical reason of individual scientists for 
crosscultural research in their effort to reveal 
«laws» valid beyond specific historical conditions.
How far is then the analysis of the previous 
part' of this paper modified through the variable 
«nation» or «culture» in the aspect of the last 
two reasons of crosscultural comparative re­
search?
We must make first clear in what sense 
«culture» and «nation» are used here. «Nation» 
as a concept has actually a narrower content than 
«culture». Anyhow there prevails a lot of am­
biguity as regards the definition of culture. It is 
sometimes defined in anthropological terms, in 
which case it is applied to any social unit, like 
family, community, nation, society. It is also 
mostly used in a broader sense covering common 
ways of life, in which case culture embraces 
many nations and is applied more or less on the 
basis of race, in the biological-anthropological 
meaning of the term.2 But even on the level of 
«nation»—which corresponds more or less to the 
existing political formation of states—differences 
between people are enormous. It seems that na­
1. A similar approach is to be found in R. T. Holt - J. E. 
Turner (eds), op. c'a., p.6. See further Berstecher, op. cit., 
pp.29 ff.
2. It is in this sense that Toynbee conceived of history as
an alternation of «civilizations» through time.
tional characteristics of racial or biological nature 
prevail in a society built up on a national basis 
and influence the way of life, the «culture» of a 
people. In this sense existing differences between 
social groups seem to lie in the organization and 
the historical development of the specific «way of 
life» of a society. Since our world is organized in 
societies on the basis of the «nation», I think that 
the latter becomes the unit which is of interest in 
discussing the problems connected with the com­
parative method in social sciences. Although run­
ning the danger of being accused of ignorance by 
anthropologists or sociologists, I would think that 
«culture» as a concept yfith a broader content is 
not of any relevance in our present discussion. I 
use, therefore, the term «crosscultural» as equal 
to «cross-national» and discuss hereafter on these 
lines. The concept of «culture» in the an­
thropological meaning of the term, if used in this 
context, might create more problems in relation 
to the applicability of the comparative method, 
which more or less take the form of special 
methodological problems of the relevant disci­
plines applying this concept. On the level of social 
sciences as a whole «national» differences as de­
fined above are sufficient for showing the limits 
of the applicability of the comparative method.3
In this frame it is important to raise the prob­
lem of diffusion between «cultures» and «na­
tions». There has always been some degree of 
openness of every society in history, although 
each one has kept its main characteristics. There 
have always been relations and phenomena com­
mon in each society—like power exercise, class 
struggles, family as a social unit, work as depen­
dent or independent social relation, community 
organization, etc.—the form in which they have 
appeared, however, or still appear, has been more 
or less different. The mode of production has 
been in any case a decisive factor in shaping each 
societal formation. I do not intend to indulge at 
this point in a historical analysis of the develop­
ment of our societal system as we have it now. 
What I would like to point out is that the process 
of diffusion between «cultures» and «nations» is a 
matter of history. The conquest of the biggest 
part of the known world at that time by Alexan­
der the Great, later on by the Romans led to a 
diffusion of the «Greek» and the «Roman» way 
of life within the societies of Asia, Africa and 
Europe north of the Alps. As regards our time, I 
think that some process of diffusion began with 
the emergence of the capitalist system as a mode 
of production and has been going on together 
with the spread of capitalism. The increasing in-
3. See further about the concepts «nation» and «culture» 
Frey, op. cit., p. 178 f., Dieckmann, op. cit., p.21 f.
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ternationalization of life since the end of the Sec­
ond World War has led to an increasing 
homogeneity all over the world. This homogeneity 
refers to the forms of societal organization (state, 
local government), of economic organization and 
behaviour (appearance of the firm and of depen­
dent labor,consumption orientation, advertisement, 
planning), of the role played by leading social 
groups and their position in society (elites, 
bourgeois classes, army), of social or family or­
ganization and behaviour (role of the head of the 
family, number of children, education) and other 
relevant factors, on which a society is based. 
There is some tendency towards more or less 
similar behaviour of the individual in every soci­
ety, of similar governmental organization, of simi­
lar behaviour in regard to family, to religion, etc. 
What I am interested in here is not so much the 
explanation of this diffusion process but rather 
the fact that «nations» have become in this way 
less different (or more similar), which is an ob­
servation in favour of the comparative method.
(It is interesting to notice that in elaborating on 
the diffusion process above I have myself begun 
comparing, which raises the question of the valid­
ity of my observations. It must be pointed out, 
however, that in making these observations, 
which are undoubtedly of a comparative nature, I 
am not using any method. The tendencies 1 ob­
serve on an international level have more or less 
the character of simple, primary observations not 
made on any scientific method, but on the 
grounds of common sense. They may be concid- 
ered as hypotheses which require investigation 
and falsification.)
With these remarks we have arrived at the core 
of our problem, because the process of diffusion 
raises the question of comparability between two 
phenomena in two different nations.We have dis­
cussed in the previous part how reality gets con­
ceptualized. Concepts like freedom, power, jus­
tice, democracy—to name only a few of them 
—are supposed to have a concrete content 
beyond any national or cultural boundaries. Used 
thus such concepts denote values that have been 
crystalized through mankind’s history and are 
considered to be timeless and spaceless. But this 
is not what concerns us here. For social research1 
it is important to define the content of such con-
1. Although I cannot discuss this problem at greater length 
here I would like to remark that 1 cannot accept the statement 
made by Holt and Richardson that «concepts are judged not 
by their truth or falsity, but by their theoretical utility» (see 
Holt-Turner, op. cit.. p.24) as this raises the problem of the 
relation between the real world and theory; it «alienates» 
theory from reality'and implies some attitude of making theory 
for the sake of theory!
cepts concretely, in time and in space. To what 
extent is, for example, freedom, as defined in our 
highly industrialized societies under the histori­
cally given parliamentary system and standard of 
living, equal to the freedom as defined in any de­
veloping country under the conditions of low 
standards of living and of the inexistence of the 
bourgeois revolution which has characterized the 
political and socio-economic development of our 
western societies. I would go so far as to argue 
that the concept of «freedom of the individual», 
say in Western Germany of today, has little in 
common with the concept of «freedom of the 
individual», say in China (or Tansania). If we had 
to compare then «freedom of the individual» be­
tween these two countries, I would say that it 
would be impossible; these «freedoms» are in­
comparable. To put it in formal terms: suppose 
you have the concept A which is defined in coun­
try Y through the elements a, b, c, d. The same 
concept is defined in country X through the ele­
ments b, e, g, h. Expressed as a function you
have then Ax = f (a, b, c, d) and Ay = f (b, e, g,
h), the only common element in both cases being 
b and the definition of the object as A. I argue 
that one may keep the name in both cases de­
noting the object as A, but it must be clear that 
Αχ Φ Ay. It may be that the diffusion between 
systems, as developed above, may bring the two 
different A’s increasingly closer and make
them more similar, but I do not think that the proc­
ess of internationalization has yet gone so far. 
I would even claim that there are limits to this 
process so that differences of national
character—«national» as defined in this paper 
—can not be eliminated.
One could extend the above argument by bring­
ing other examples. Take, for example, the notion 
of «savings» in economics. Applied in macro­
economics as a variable connected with capital 
accumulation and irrespective of the mechanism 
through which it takes place, «savings» does not 
create problems from the point of view of com­
parison as a method, although there emerge prob­
lems in regard to the data. But let us not consider 
them. If one uses the notion «savings», however, 
under capitalist conditions, which means that one 
is interested in knowing the «propensity to save» 
of different groups and one applies it in a de­
veloping country, the concept loses any meaning, 
since the income level is very low in such a 
country and wages are a small part of national 
income; consequently «savings» as a behavioural 
variable of social groups does not exist. I refer 
here actually to the general problem of the rele­
vance of economic theory as developed in west­
ern capitalist societies for developing countries in
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which completely different conditions prevail.1
The problem of identification becomes in this 
respect crucial. My argument has gone so far 
beyond the conclusion drawn in the previous part 
of this paper according to which comparability is 
a function of the concept used to define a 
phenomenon. In a crosscultural -frame I have 
challenged this conclusion in the sense that it 
does not have general validity. 1 would specify 
this restriction in the following way: We can ob­
serve tendencies across cultures and nations, we 
can detect developments but it is questionable 
whether we can compare them in a strict sense. 
The following three reasons support this state­
ment:
Firstly, the question of identification; i.e. it is 
not always possible to identify phenomena across 
cultures and nations. Every time we want to com­
pare we must prove in advance that we compare 
«comparable» things because according to strict 
logic, even if there existed only one case where 
identification were not possible, we would have to 
prove the comparability of all other existing cases 
—the number of which is indefinite—in order to find 
out this case.
Secondly, the reliability of data. 1 will not pon­
der on this point since many others have pointed 
it out.2
Thirdly, the question of measurement, that is of 
comparison as a method in a narrow sense. As­
suming that both previous conditions are fulfilled, 
i.e. that we have an. identified phenomenon and 
reliable data, I would like to point out that our 
techniques themselves restrict the applicability of 
our method, as measuring (as already said) is not 
justifiable in itself but needs to be justified in its 
scope, in its implications and in relation to the 
object of measurement. I would mention as ex­
amples the concept of «income» or of «per capita 
income» as a measure of economic development3
1. As an example of the ridiculousness of traditional theory 
I would like to cite the paper of H. R. Hemmer. «Zur Verein­
barkeit des Wachstums und Beschäftigungszieles in 
Entwicklungsländern» in H. Priebe (ed), Beiträge zur Beur­
teilung von Entwicklungsstrategien, Berlin 1974, pp.61. ff, in 
which he develops a neo-classical model for developing coun­
tries. His final result is that the extent to which employment 
and growth are compatible depends among others also on the 
partial savings-quotas of capitalists and workers! In many de­
veloping countries there do not exist either capitalists or 
workers, at least in an important amount and at wages high 
above the existence minimum. See also my comments in M. 
Nikolinakos, «Kritische Anmerkungen zur traditionellen 
Entwicklungstheorie», in Priebe, op. eit., pp.87 ff.
2. See Scheuch, op. cit.,Mitchell, op. eit., Merritt, op. eit., 
pp.24 ff. Berstecher, op. cit., pp.72 ff. Dieckmann op. cit., 
pp.92 ff. P. Deane, «Aggregate Comparisons: The Validity and 
Reliability of Economic Data», in Rokkan, op. cit., pp.171 ff.
3. See on this point G. Ohlin, «Aggregate Comparisons:
Problems and Prospects of Quantitative Analysis Based on
or the «social indicators» that are proposed as a 
better method.4
It is now time, however, to discuss at this 
point concretely' the further problem of the reason 
of crosscultural comparative research that is 
closely connected to the scope and the implica­
tions of measurement and which 1 posed at the 
beginning of this section. I consider it as crucial 
for evaluating the comparative method itself. I 
have not done anything else in this section but 
clear the way to this question dealing with all 
complementary problems connected to it and de­
fining in this way the limits within which a posi­
tive answer can be expected.
In asking for the causes that have led to the 
emergence of the comparative method in the 
postwar period I named three among which the 
testing of theories aimed at revealing «laws» and 
policy relevance. If a theory «explains and pre­
dicts social phenomena»5 crosscultural compari­
son aiming at testing such theories must find in at 
least two systems the causes leading to the same 
effect in both of them—this is the «expla- 
nation»-part of a theory—furthermore to fix 
the conditions that are sufficient and necessary 
for a reproduction of the same phenomenon at a 
later point in time and probably at a different 
point in space—this is the «prediction»-part of a 
theory. Take for example a very interesting case 
both for political science and economics. In 
studying the case of the People’s Republic of 
China one comes to the conclusion: «China has 
been able to develop economically and socially 
avoiding at the same time the vicissitudes of the 
majority of developing countries through a 
socialist revolution». In this statement «revo­
lution» is the necessary condition for initiat­
ing an autonomous independent development pro­
cess. If I decided then on theoretical grounds to 
initiate such a process in another country, I 
should see to it that a «revolution» takes place, 
which means that I should be able to reproduce 
in this country the similar conditions that led to a 
revolution in China! I know that I am making 
some epistemological bias here, but I think that 
the case is useful in order to show the irre- 
producibility of historical conditions in time and
National Accounts», in Rokkan, op. cit., pp. 163 ff. See 
further on the question of measurement S. L. Thrupp, 
«Diachronic Methods in Comparative Politics», in Holt- 
Turner. op. cit., pp.343 ff. Przeworski-Teune, op. cit., pp.91 
ff, 113 ff. Berstecher, op. cit., pp.43 ff. Dieckmann, op. cit., 
pp.47 ff. 60 ff and R. E. Mitchell. «Survey Materials Collected 
in the Developing Countries: Obstacles to Comparisons», in 
Rokkan, op. cit., pp.219-226.
4. Compare R. Werner, Soziale Indikatoren und politische 
Planung, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1975.
5. See Przeworski-Teune. op. cit., p.74.
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space. Revolutions do take place—not all revolu­
tions are, however, of the same type—but each 
one is unique and unrepeatable. Another example 
in this context is the theory of the stages of 
economic growth of Rostow where economic de­
velopment has been put within definite theoretical 
molds implying some regularity subject to general 
causal laws. This theory has been amply criti­
cized and shown as invalid.1
It is not necessary to develop at this point 
further the problem of «laws» in social sciences. I 
would only like to empasize how difficult it is 
within the discussion of development of unde­
veloped societies, which is the field on which 
nowadays the leading social sciences—economics, 
politics and sociology—meet to detect causal rela­
tions in a strict sense and even to define situa­
tions. In my doctoral thesis about Income Dis­
tribution and Development Process I have investi­
gated the conclusion drawn initially by Kuznets, 
that income distribution in a country becomes 
more equital the higher the stage of development 
it has reached. I found that this conclusion was 
dependent on the method used and that further­
more the application of different criteria for de­
fining the «stage of development» and «equity» as 
well as of different measures for measuring ineq­
uity leads to extremely contradictory results. 
One interesting result is that the more concretely 
some stage of development is defined the less the 
existing statistical data support Kuznet’s 
conclusion.2
In regard to policy relevance it should be asked 
how far the comparative method renders useful 
results. I would think that policy implications 
arising out of a study in other nations are only of 
a conditional relevance for some other. Some re­
lations found to be similar in countries A, B and 
C and leading to some conclusions can not neces­
sarily be relevant also for country D. I would 
claim that one has to prove the similarity of the 
conditions existing in country D with those exist­
ing in country A, B and C if one wants to trans­
late the results of the research in countries A, B 
and C into policy measures in country D. Even 
assuming this similarity it can not be expected 
that the development of the phenomenon in coun­
try D will be the same as observed in countries 
A, B and C at some previous point or period in 
time.
1. See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, 
Cambridge I960, also the Economics of Take-off, Paris: Inter­
national Economic Association, 1973.
2. See M. Nikolinakos, Einkommensverteilung und Entwick­
lungsprozess, Diss. Köln 1967, in particular pp.206 ff. See 
further on the problem of comparative analysis in development 
theory. D. Lemer, «Comparative Analysis of Processes of 
Modernization», in Rokkan, op. cit., pp.82 ff.
I would like to refer in this context to the 
essay in «Comparative Analysis» of Morris 
Janowitz on The Military in the Political De­
velopment of New Nations,3 because it is an il­
luminating example in this respect. «Even though 
comparison at the nation-stake level is an illusive 
task» Janowitz undertakes the study of «military 
institutions and military elites in their common 
characteristics and in their national differences in 
order to throw light on the various patterns of 
civil-military relations found in new nations.»4 I 
have not been able to find out the method used 
by Janowitz in studying the internal organization 
of the military in a number of nations or the rela­
tions between army and society. The measure­
ment of the degree of similarity as the core of the 
comparative method in a narrow sense is missing. 
One is faced with general interpretations out of 
general observations not bound to any epis­
temological background. The reader is surprised 
to begin the reading of the last chapter with the 
statement devoid of any meaning: «it appears to 
be a universal political conception that a new 
state requires an army. In the course of this 
study, it was hoped that at least some new na­
tions would make it national policy not to create 
an army, or at least de facto to rely on a mobile 
police force». 5 Asking, finally, for the meaning 
of such a comparative study, I can not feel satis­
fied on theoretical grounds with the final conclu­
sion that from the point of view of «political 
assistance» «it implies imparting on an intellectual 
basis the successful experiences of military 
oligarchies that have been able to limit their polit­
ical involvement. Mutual assistance among new 
nations will be as important as the influence of 
the superpowers. It requires, in turn, the training 
of political organizers—to middle-level, and 
grass-roots agents—just as economic assistance 
requires the training of industrial and agricultural 
personnel».6 This conclusion corresponds to the 
idea of «civil action», i.e. «the idea that the 
military is an agent of development», which «has 
not become a pervasive outlook in these military 
assistance programmes, except recently in the 
case of South Vietnam»!7 The political implica­
tions from such a comparative study are in my 
opinion clear at least from the point of view of 
American foreign policy.
In regard to policy implications of the compara­
tive ^method it becomes thus apparent that in a 
polito-economie sense the question gets more
3. Chicago and London, 1964.
4. Janowitz, op. cit., p.vi.
5. Janowitz, op. cit., p.100.
6. Janowitz, op. cit., p. 105 f.
7. Janowitz, op. cit., p.97.
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complicated if the agent of policy implementation 
is considered on the grounds of the results of 
crosscultural research. I would say that so far as 
crosscultural investigations are initiated for the 
sake of some political aims connected with the 
expected results, the margin of bias is great 
enough to influence the method itself and in this 
sense the results attained are more or less con­
ditioned by the initial aim. One might speak in 
this case of an indirect manipulation in the sense 
that a method is biased to give conditioned re­
sults.
To apply my second criterion mentioned in the 
first section of the paper the comparative method 
is useless or it has some political relevance. If the 
conclusion drawn above is correct that the results 
of crosscultural research are of a conditional rele­
vance in terms of policy implications the evalua­
tion of the comparative method tends to declare it 
«useless», otherwise the notion «political rel­
evance» must be understood in terms of poli­
tics and not in terms of policy implementation.
It must be made clear that the above statement 
refers to a strictly defined comparative method as 
a measure of the degree of similarity between 
more than two objects of observation. It does not 
imply the compilation of data on a comparative 
basis, as is the case in the kind of empirical re­
search done by international organisations men­
tioned above which aim at observing trends and 
developments of a general character. In the case, 
for example, of changes in Europe’s trade 1 im­
ports and exports of countries are examined for 
the sake of detecting the general trends, not for 
the sake of detecting the differences between 
countries, as the development of imports and ex­
ports of a country depends on the internal 
economic development and the development on 
the international market, and not on the move­
ment of imports and exports themselves of other 
countries. By comparing the imports of country A 
and of country B I want perhaps to find out the 
causes of their specific development, but I can 
hardly imagine that the conclusions I draw have 
any practical relevance for country A or B re­
spectively. Whether they serve to verify a theory 
is a matter of constructing the theory. The theory 
can be constructed to apply only for country A or 
B. If it is constructed with a more ambitious aim, 
then it has to face the problems I have alluded to 
above.
IV. summary of conclusions
I would summarize the argument of this paper 
in the following points:
1. See Economic Bulletin for Europe, Voi. 22/No. 1, N. 
York 1971, pp.l ff.
a) Every scientific research is of political rele­
vance in the Aristotelian as well as in a polito- 
economie sense, or it is useless.
b) Time and space as the two definitional ele­
ments of comparison give the historical dimension 
of the phenomena. Difference or similarity of 
phenomena is thus reduced to difference of simi­
larity of conditions at two or more points in time 
and in space, which is a question of the repro­
ducibility of historical conditions.
c) Comparison as a method implies the compara­
bility of two things and aims at showing equality 
between them or proving their inequality.
d) Comparability is a function of the concept used 
to define a phenomenon and in this sense relative 
by definition.
e) There are two distinct aspects in the process of 
comparison: the one referring to the identification 
of a phenomenon—which means defining its 
properties—the other to the degree of similarity 
(or equality) of two or more phenomena at two or 
more different points in time and/or in space.
f) Comparison in a narrow sense as a method in 
social sciences aims at measuring the degree of 
similarity between two or more objects in time 
and/or in space. The comparative method in a 
narrow sense is thus the techniques and proce­
dures of research in the service of the above aim.
g) Every technique of measuring phenomena in 
the process of comparing needs to be justified in 
its scope, in its implications, finally in relation to 
the object of measurement.
h) The operation of identification of phenomena 
in the comparative method is common to all so­
cial sciences. Comparison as an operation of 
measuring the degree of similarity between two or 
more phenomena is not identical in all social sci­
ences. The techniques of measurement for each 
discipline differ according to the phenomena to be 
observed and compared as well as according to 
the general scope of comparing.
i) The comparative method in a narrow sense has 
been proposed and developed in the postwar 
period primarily as a method of comparing 
phenomena across cultures and nations.
j) The main three plausible reasons for crosscul­
tural comparative research are: 1) the concern 
with the economic development of developing 
countries in the postwar period (historical 
reason); 2) the testing of hypotheses and theories 
beyond national boundaries aiming at revealing 
«laws» (comparison as a substitute for exper­
iment) (methodological reason); 3) practical poli­
cy aims (political reason).
k) The concept of «nation» is to be preferred 
to the concept of «culture» in discussing compar­
ison as a method of social research; crosscultur-
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al is taken, therefore, to mean crossnational.
l) Diffusion leads to a homogenisation of phenom­
ena across cultures and nations which has been in­
creasing in the postwar period although this has 
not yet led to an elimination of national dif­
ferences.
m) It is possible to observe tendencies across cul­
tures and nations, furthermore to detect develop­
ments, but it is questionable whether it is possible 
to compare them in a strict sense for three main 
reasons referring to the problem of identification, 
the reliability of data and measurement itself.
n) Crosscultural comparison aiming at testing 
theories or general hypotheses must find in at 
least two systems the causes leading to the same 
effect in both of them (explanation part of a 
theory), furthermore to fix the conditions that are
sufficient and necessary for a reproduction of the 
same phenomenon at a later point in time or at a 
different point in space (prediction part of a 
theory). Such a task has been so far unsuccessful.
o) Policy implications arising out of a study in 
other nations are only of conditional relevance for 
some other. Even assuming the similarity of con­
ditions it is uncertain if the development of a 
phenomenon will follow the same track in a new 
country that it had followed in one or more other 
countries previously.
p) Also the comparative method is either useless 
or is of political relevance (point a). On the 
grounds of conclusion under o, the comparative 
method must be declared either as «useless» or 
political in terms of politics, and not in terms of 
policy implementation.
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